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in facial expression of emotion,
gender, and object processing
Pamela M. Pallett† and Ming Meng*
Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, USA
To distinguish between high-level visual processing mechanisms, the degree to which
holistic processing is involved in facial identity, facial expression, and object perception
is often examined through measuring inversion effects. However, participants may be
biased by different experimental paradigms to use more or less holistic processing. Here
we take a novel psychophysical approach to directly compare human face and object
processing in the same experiment, with face processing broken into two categories:
variant properties and invariant properties as they were tested using facial expressions
of emotion and gender, respectively. Specifically, participants completed two different
perceptual discrimination tasks. One involved making judgments of stimulus similarity
and the other tested the ability to detect differences between stimuli. Each task was
completed for both upright and inverted stimuli. Results show significant inversion effects
for the detection of differences in facial expressions of emotion and gender, but not
for objects. More interestingly, participants exhibited a selective inversion deficit when
making similarity judgments between different facial expressions of emotion, but not
for gender or objects. These results suggest a three-way dissociation between facial
expression of emotion, gender, and object processing.
Keywords: facial expression recognition, object recognition, face inversion effect, face recognition, emotion
Introduction
Our daily social interactions rely upon complex visual cues that guide us in face detection, identity
recognition, and emotion perception. Accordingly, a large contingency of the face processing
literature revolves around either the differences between processing the constant (e.g., identity) and
changeable (e.g., emotion) aspects of a face or the difference between face and object processing.
Yet, what characterizes the various encoding mechanisms that underlie high-level visual processing
in facial identity, facial expression, and object perception remains unclear. To address this issue, the
current study examines differences in identity, emotion, and object processing by assessing the effect
of inversion in two different perceptual discrimination tasks.
The effect of inversion is highly reliable and often examined to distinguish between
face processing and object processing. A face inversion effect (FIE) occurs when inversion
disproportionately impairs the recognition of faces relative to objects (Yin, 1969). It has been
proposed that the FIE results from an orientation dependent processing scheme, in which upright
faces trigger primarily holistic encoding, while inverted faces and objects recruit a more feature-
based approach (Young et al., 1987; Farah et al., 1998; Hole et al., 1999; Maurer et al., 2002; Goffaux
and Rossion, 2007; Rossion, 2008; McKone and Yovel, 2009). Holistic processing binds the facial
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features to their spatial arrangement and the external contour
of the face, resulting in a single integrated upright face percept.
By contrast, feature-based processing leads to representations of
inverted faces and objects that are a collection of individual parts,
e.g., eyes, nose, and mouth (Sergent, 1984; Tanaka and Farah,
1993; McKone and Yovel, 2009).
Unlike face vs. object processing, identity and emotion
processing often exhibit similar inversion effects (e.g., McKelvie,
1995;White, 1999; Fallshore andBartholow, 2003; Prkachin, 2003;
Tate et al., 2006). For example, when two faces containing identical
top-halves (e.g., both Pam) are aligned with different bottom-
halves (e.g., Bethany or Karen), the top-halves are incorrectly
perceived as different (Young et al., 1987). Similarly, when two
faces with top-halves depicting the same emotion (e.g., angry)
are aligned with bottom-halves containing different emotions
(e.g., happy or sad), composite-emotion effects emerge in which
the identical top halves appear to display different emotions
(Calder et al., 2000; Calder and Jansen, 2005). However, the
degree to which inversion impairs emotion recognition depends
upon the emotion observed and varies with experimental design
(e.g., McKelvie, 1995; Prkachin, 2003; Derntl et al., 2009). For
example, Derntl et al. (2009) reported an inversion effect for anger
recognition for brief presentation times only (200 ms), whereas
McKelvie (1995) found in inversion effect for anger recognition
with extended viewing durations (15 s). Conversely, Derntl et al.
(2009) reported an inversion effect for happy recognition with
both brief and unlimited presentations, whereas McKelvie (1995)
found no inversion effect for happy recognition. By contrast,
the effect of inversion on identity recognition is highly stable
(e.g., Diamond and Carey, 1986; reviewed in Yin, 1969; Rossion
and Gauthier, 2002). As a result, it is unclear whether holistic
processing is as essential for emotion recognition as it is for
identity recognition, or if emotion recognition may also tap into
feature-based processing mechanisms.
Previous studies comparing facial expression of emotion and
identity processing are also limited by differences in both
classification experience, i.e., basic level (the basic emotion
categories, Ekman, 1992) vs. subordinate level classifications
(Karen, Pam, Bethany, etc.), and overall exposure. That is,
exposure to any one identity is bound to be less than exposure
to different facial expressions of emotion. For this reason, the
current study uses gender instead of identity, since gender is both
ubiquitous and invariant. Gender is also proposed to use similar
processing pathways as identity, i.e., a pathway dedicated to the
“invariant properties” of the face (Bruce and Young, 1986; Ng
et al., 2006), and co-varieswith identity (i.e., gender cannot change
without identity changing, but not vice versa), whereas emotion
is generally associated with a “variable properties” pathway. It
should be noted, however, that the relationship between gender
and identity processing is unclear. Individuals with prosopagnosia
can recognize gender despite impaired identity recognition
(DeGutis et al., 2012), and yet, adults with autism spectrum
disorders (ASD) exhibit greater impairments for both gender and
identity processing relative to controls (Behrmann et al., 2006).
Thus, our results should be taken as reflective of the invariant
processing pathway as recruited for gender recognition, which
likely overlaps with that for identity recognition.
Finally, a key and novel facet of the current study is the
usage of two different perceptual discrimination tasks. Pallett
and MacLeod (2011) reported that “more or less” judgments
of differences in facial feature distances are robust to inversion
effects. When participants were asked to indicate whether Face 1
had a greater eye-to-mouth distance than Face 2, discrimination
sensitivity did not depend on face orientation. However, there
was an inversion benefit, with faster responses to inverted faces.
These results suggest that “more or less” judgments induce a
more feature-based processing style, in an otherwise holistically
processed face. In contrast, “same/different” judgments resulted
in substantial inversion effects; decisions on whether the eye-
to-mouth distance in Face 1 was the same or different from
Face 2 revealed greater sensitivity with upright faces. These
results suggest that “same/different” judgments engage the natural,
holistic face processing mechanisms, consistent with previous
studies (reviewed inMcKone and Yovel, 2009). Here, we capitalize
on this finding by using a similar method to address the
fundamental differences in cognitive architecture that underlie
the dissociations in emotion vs. gender (i.e., identity) and face
vs. object processing. Specifically, we asked participants to make
similarity comparisons (which are akin to the “more or less”
judgments in Pallett and MacLeod (2011), e.g., “Is this face more
angry or happy?”) and different detection [which are similar to
the same/different judgments in Pallett andMacLeod (2011), e.g.,
“which face is different”] for upright and inverted stimuli varying
in gender (male–female), emotion (angry–happy), or car type
(BMW–Honda).
Materials and Methods
Participants
Nineteen students from Dartmouth College (7 male, 12 female;
aged 18–22 years) participated in exchange for course credit. All
participants had normal or corrected to normal visual acuity. This
study was carried out in accordance with the recommendations
of the Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects at
Dartmouth College. All subjects gave written informed consent
in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Stimuli
The stimuli were generated from grayscale photographs of one
happy Caucasianmale, one angry Caucasianmale, one expression
neutral Caucasianmale, one expression neutral Caucasian female,
and two side profile photographs of cars (a BMW and a
Honda). The identity of the Caucasian male was the same in all
photographs. We chose cars as stimuli because like faces, cars are
generally viewed in a single orientation (i.e., upright), and our
exposure to cars from infancy onwards is extensive. Cars also
make good control stimuli since they vary in both their features
(e.g., type of wheels, style of door, number of doors, etc.) and their
configurations (e.g., aspect ratio, distance between the wheels
relative to car length, distance between the front window and front
lights relative to car height, etc.). Similar to faces, it can also be
necessary to identity a familiar car (i.e., your car) from a large
“crowd” of cars (e.g., in a parking lot). There are very few other
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objects (biologically based or man-made) for which we have that
experience. For these reasons, we believe cars make good control
objects.We chose side profiles for cars rather than frontal profiles,
since the front of a carmay be perceived as face-like (e.g., lights for
eyes, etc.).
A series of 101 upright “test” stimuli were created by morphing
from the 100%Happy (0%Angry) to 100%Angry (0%Happy). An
additional 101 test stimuli were similarly created forMale–Female
and BMW–Honda (Figure 1A). Stimuli were further inverted to
create a total of six image continua: upright emotion, upright
gender, upright cars, inverted emotion, inverted gender, and
inverted cars. Faces were positioned within an oval frame that
covered the top of the head only. This removed the hair while
preserving external contour below the ears. By using 101 morphs
in each stimulus continuum, we ensured a smooth gradation
of change between test stimuli (i.e., no giveaways) and the
sensitivity needed to obtain precise threshold measures. Faces
subtended 8.73°  11.96°and cars subtended 18.28°  6.28°.
In Matlab, all stimuli were equated to be of the same mean
luminance (61.45 cd/m2) and root-mean square contrast (40). We
also ensured that stimuli contained no significant differences in
spatial frequency content (mean slope in log-energy vs. log-SF
space =  1.422, SE = 0.026) and size. Size was measured by the
total number of pixels in the image that were a part of the stimulus
and not the background (mean size = 79,252 pixels, SE = 168).
All images were placed on a black rectangle and were presented
against a gray background (61.45 cd/m2). Stimuli were presented
on a 21-inch (53.3 cm) Dell P1130 CRT-monitor (1280  1024
pixel, 85 Hz) using Matlab r2008a and the Psychophysics Toolbox
(Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997).
Design and Procedure
Participants were tested in a dimly lit room at a distance of 50 cm
using a headrest. Three stimuli were presented simultaneously
(Figures 1B,C) and remained on display until key press response.
Test stimuli were determined by an adaptive staircase (described
in Staircase Design, below); image category and orientation were
randomized across trials.
There were two parts to the experiment. In the similarity
comparison task, participants viewed two templates and one test
stimulus and identified which template was more similar to the
test stimulus. The two template stimuli were displayed in the
upper left and upper right quadrants of the display, respectively,
with location randomized across trials; the test stimulus was
centered in the bottomof the display (Figure 1B). The participants
received the following instructions, “There are three images, one
in the upper left, one in the upper right, and one in the lower center
of the display. You need to say whether the image at the bottom
looks more like the image on the left, or the image on the right.”
Selections were made by key press. In the difference detection task,
participants viewed two distractor stimuli and one target stimulus.
They were told “There are three images, two are the same and
one is different. You need to select the image that is different”
(i.e., the target). Distractor stimuli were always 50% Happy/50%
Angry, 50% Male/50% Female, or 50% BMW/50% Honda (i.e.,
emotion neutral, gender neutral, and car identity neutral). The
locations of the target and distractors were randomized within
the upper left, upper right, and lower center of the display
(Figure 1C).
Staircase Design
An adaptive staircase procedure based on the PEST method
(Taylor and Creelman, 1967) was used to obtain individual
subject thresholds, as in Pallett and MacLeod (2011), Pallett and
Dobkins (2013), and Pallett et al. (2014). Each condition had two
randomly interleaved staircases. In the similarity comparison task,
one staircase homed in on the 80% correct morph for template 1
and the other for template 2, e.g., 80% “more similar to happy”
test stimulus and 80% “more similar to angry” test stimulus.
Analogously, in the difference detection task, one staircase homed
in on the 80% correct target stimulus for upright happy; the other
homed in on the 80% correct target stimulus for upright angry.
For each staircase, the beginning test (or target) stimulus was
the 80% morph (e.g., 80% Happy, 20% Angry). In the similarity
comparison task, future test stimuli in the upright happy staircase
decreased in similarity to the happy template by one step size
after a “more similar to happy” response (i.e., making it harder
to discriminate) and increased in similarity to the happy template
by four step sizes following a “more similar to angry” response
(i.e., making it easier to discriminate), and so forth for the angry,
male, female, BMW, and Honda staircases. In the difference
detection task, distractors were always 50% Happy/50% Angry,
50%Male/50%Female, or 50%BMW/50%Honda. Thus, correctly
identifying the target stimulus from the distractors increased
the similarity between the target and distractors by one step
size (i.e., shifted the target closer to 50/50, making it harder to
discriminate), and an incorrect response increased the difference
between the target stimulus and the distractors by four step sizes
(i.e., making it easier to discriminate). Maximum step size for all
staircases was 20 morph units.
The value of the step size was determined by an acceleration
factor of 1.2 and a reversal factor of power of 1.6. Following either
two correct or two incorrect responses, step size wasmultiplied by
the acceleration factor, thus increasing the step size. Following a
reversal in correctness, step size was multiplied by (1/acceleration
factor)^reversal power, thus decreasing the step size.
In both tasks participants were informed that “Every time you
get it right, the taskwill get harder, and every time you get it wrong,
it will become easier. If you don’t know the answer, that’s ok, just
guess. If it starts to feel like it’s showing you the same thing again
and again, then that’s good. It’s supposed to get that way.”
Each task had 50 trials per condition (3 stimulus categories 2
orientations). Since discrimination near a threshold boundary is
quite difficult, after every 10 trials participants viewed an easy trial
in which the test stimulus was identical to one of the templates
(e.g., 100% Happy). Thus participants viewed 600 experiment
trials and 60 easy trials. Data from the easy trials were not
analyzed.
Data Analysis
Thresholds for each task were determined by fitting the
proportion of correct responses for each participant and each
condition to a logistic function and determining the average
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Examples of test stimuli. 101 morphs were created between
100% Happy/0% Angry and 0% Happy/100% Angry (and likewise for gender
and cars). Seven morphed faces and seven morphed cars are shown here.
Since we do not have permission to publish the faces from the experiment, as
an example, the figure shows faces from the NimStim Database (Tottenham
et al., 2009). (B) Examples of similarity comparison trials for facial expressions of
emotion, gender, and cars, respectively. The upper left and upper right images
are the templates, and the bottom center image varies between the two
templates. (C) Examples of difference detection trials for facial expressions of
emotion, gender, and cars, respectively. Two of the three faces are 50%
Happy/50% Angry (and likewise for gender and cars). Here, the upper left image
is different.
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of the distance (in morph units) between the 50% morph and
80% “more similar to” morph (or 80% correct morph in the
difference detection task). Thus, if a participant’s threshold for
upright happy was 70% Happy/30% Angry and upright angry
was 20% Happy/80% Angry, then the participant’s discrimination
threshold for upright emotion was 25 morph units.
Since the data were normally distributed
(Kolmogorov–Smirnov ps > 0.05), our initial analysis is
conducted on the original linear thresholds. But, to compare
inversion effects between stimulus categories, we used logged
thresholds since those provided us with a normal distribution.
We used the following equation to compute inversion effect
scores (IE Scores):
IE Score = [log(Upright Threshold)
  log(Inverted Threshold)]=log(Upright Threshold):
(1)
The formula scales the inversion effect relative to the original
discriminability of the stimulus. Thus, a positive number
represents a benefit for upright discrimination and a negative
number corresponds with better discrimination of inverted
stimuli.
Response times (RTs) for correct trials only were analyzed.
Any RTs beyond two standard deviations away from the mean of
that participant’s data were excluded as outliers. In the similarity
comparison, the mean exclusion rate was 5.3% (SD = 0.8%),
and in the difference detection the mean exclusion rate was
5.5% (SD = 1.1%). The remaining RTs for each participant were
averaged within each condition to provide mean RTs for each
combination of task type, orientation, and stimulus category.
Thresholds and RTs were each analyzed in a 2 (task type:
similarity comparison vs. difference detection)  2 (orientation:
upright vs. inverted)  3 (stimulus category: emotion vs. gender
vs. cars) repeated measures ANOVA using SPSS 17.0. Significant
interactionswere further examined using t-tests with a Bonferroni
corrected p= 0.008 (i.e., corrected for six comparisons).
Results
There was a significant main effect of task type with greater
sensitivity (i.e., discrimination ability) for similarity comparison
than for difference detection, F(1,18) = 96.4, p < 0.001, !2p = 0.84
(Figure 2). There was also a significant two-way interaction
between task and orientation [F(1,18) = 18.1, p < 0.001,
!2p = 0.50] and a three-way interaction between task, orientation
and stimulus category [F(2,36) = 5.50, p = 0.008, !2p = 0.23].
To better understand these interactions, we separated the
results by task type and conducted one-sample t-tests on IE
Scores.
In the similarity comparison task, only emotion discrimination
was impaired by inversion [t(18) = 5.85, p < 0.001, IE Score
Mean= 0.37, SD= 0.063], although there was a mild trend for an
inversion deficit with gender discrimination [gender: t(18)= 1.75,
p = 0.097, IE Score Mean = 0.13, SD = 0.091; cars: p = 0.44,
IE Score Mean =  0.070, SD = 0.095]. By contrast, in the
difference detection task, both emotion and gender discrimination
were impaired by inversion [emotion: t(18) = 5.85, p < 0.001,
B
A
FIGURE 2 | N = 19. Error bars denote  the standard error of the mean. (A),
Lower thresholds reflect better performance. Mean thresholds for perceiving a
difference in emotion, gender, and cars in the difference detection and
similarity comparison tasks. (B) Size of the inversion effect relative to upright
performance.
IE Score Mean = 0.46, SD = 0.068; gender: t(18) = 5.85,
p < 0.001, IE Score Mean = 0.15, SD = 0.035], and as before, car
discrimination was unaffected (p = 0.35, IE Score Mean = 0.098,
SD = 0.10).
Analysis of Response Times
To ensure that our threshold results did not reflect differences
in speed-accuracy trade-offs, we additionally examined RTs
(Figure 3). Results from our 2 (task type: similarity comparison
vs. difference detection) 2 (orientation: upright vs. inverted) 3
(stimulus category: emotion vs. gender vs. cars) repeatedmeasures
ANOVA indicated that participants were faster to respond during
similarity comparisons than difference detection [F(1,18) = 52.9,
p < 0.001, !2p = 0.75]. In addition, there was a significant
stimulus category  orientation interaction [F(2,36) = 5.54,
p= 0.008, !2p = 0.24] and a task stimulus category orientation
interaction [F(2,36) = 5.45, p = 0.009, !2p = 0.23]. To better
understand these interactions, we assessed the effect of inversion
on gender, emotion, and car RTs using paired-samples t-tests.
Results showed that different detection for cars was slowed by
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FIGURE 3 | N = 19. Error bars denote  the standard error of the mean.
Mean response times for correct responses for the difference detection and
similarity comparison tasks.
inversion [t(18) = 2.63, p = 0.017, Inverted RT–Upright RT
Mean = 0.33 s, SD = 0.44], whereas gender discrimination
was faster with inversion [t(18) = 2.12, p = 0.048, Inverted
RT–Upright RT Mean =  0.21 s, SD = 0.57]. However,
neither of these remain significant after Bonferroni correction
(p= 0.008). Results for facial expressions of emotion also showed
no effect of inversion on RTs (p = 0.23, Inverted RT–Upright
RT Mean = 0.24 s, SD = 0.83), thus ruling out the possibility of
speed-accuracy trade-offs.
Discussion
The current study assessed facial expression of emotion, gender,
and object processing with a novel psychophysical approach. Key
to this approach is the use of two qualitatively different tasks
(see Pallett and MacLeod, 2011), employment of an adaptive
staircase design and carefully controlled stimuli. Accordingly, we
found that (1) inversion decreases sensitivity (i.e., discrimination
ability) to differences in facial expressions of emotion and impairs
the perception of similarity between two facial expressions of
emotion, (2) inversion decreases sensitivity to differences in
gender, but the perception of similarity in gender for two faces
is unaffected, and (3) inversion has no significant effect on
sensitivity to differences between objects of the same object class,
and the assessment of similarity between two objects of the same
object class is also unaffected. These results are consistent with
previous findings of greater inversion effects for face recognition
than object recognition (e.g., Yin, 1969; Ge et al., 2006). More
interestingly, these results demonstrate a three-way dissociation
between the processing of gender, facial expressions of emotion
and objects, in which object encoding recruits a predominantly
feature-based processing strategy, gender encoding involves a
primarily holistic processing strategy, and facial expression of
emotion processing appears to be flexible, i.e., either feature-based
or holistic depending on the nature of the task at hand.
Why was a difference between facial expression of emotion
and gender discrimination found in the similarity comparison
task but not in the difference detection task? We propose that
this finding may reflect the same processes that produce Garner
interference for facial expression and identity recognition
(i.e., an irrelevant dimension effect). Garner interference
occurs when the processing of information from one stimulus
dimension is altered or impaired by variations in a second,
ancillary stimulus dimension. This interference suggests
the two dimensions are not independently represented, but
rather interrelated. In the case of face identity and emotion
recognition, variations in identity decrease accuracy for facial
expression of emotion recognition and vice versa (Schweinberger
et al., 1999; White, 2001; Ganel and Goshen-Gottstein, 2004;
Galster et al., 2009), suggesting some degree of joint encoding
for identity and facial expressions of emotion. Consistent
with this notion, the observation of a mild impairment with
contrast-negation for perceptual encoding of gender and
expression, but a substantial gender-specific impairment
during face discrimination (Pallett and Meng, 2013), suggests
that gender and facial expressions of emotion processing
may begin jointly but later separate during recognition or
decision-making.
It remains unclear, however, why similarity judgments would
engage different processing for gender and facial expressions of
emotion, while difference detection appears to involve the same
encoding scheme. One possibility is that our results reflect a
difference in task expertise. Facial expressions of emotion are in
a constant state of flux and naturally contain various gradations of
one or several emotions (e.g., happy to get a good parking spot vs.
ecstatic about winning a trip toDisneyworld). Generally speaking,
however, a person’s gender does not change. The importance
of expertise in face processing ability has been demonstrated
across several domains, from cataract recovery (Le Grand et al.,
2001) to other-race (Sangrigoli et al., 2005; Tanaka and Pierce,
2009) and other-age effects (Kuefner et al., 2008). Indeed, it
has further been suggested that extensive experience can result
in the development of face-like inversion effects for objects of
expertise (e.g., Gauthier et al., 1999). As such, it is quite possible
that differences in experience underlie the greater sensitivity
to inversion observed during facial expression of emotion
discrimination.
Finally, our results highlight the importance of using multiple
approaches when studying high-level vision. Our goal was to
characterize various encoding mechanisms that underlie facial
identity, facial expression, and object perception. This could
have not been accomplished had we only used one perceptual
discrimination task. Specifically, we compared similarity
judgment and difference detection. The significant difference in
discrimination sensitivity observed between tasks replicated the
results of Pallett andMacLeod (2011), showing that these tasks tap
into different processing mechanisms. Comparisons like this may
provide a newperspective onhow the brain encodes and interprets
different types of visual information. The use of two tasks can also
demonstrate the potential influence of top-down mechanisms on
bottom-up visual processing, i.e., the mechanisms by which the
cognitive goals of the task influence visual information encoding.
Along these lines, research on the composite face effect and
part-whole effect, two measures that are largely believed to reflect
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the holistic processing of faces, suggests that they result from
unique processing strategies (reviewed in Richler et al., 2012).
Future studies are expected to investigate how a differential
recruitment of processing strategies may be task-driven and/or
goal-oriented.
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